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Constitutional Law-SIxTH AmENDMENT-RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL-
A BALANCING TEST
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)
The Supreme Court has addressed itself infrequently to the sixth
amendment guarantee of a speedy trial.' Furthermore, each previous
decision considered only a single aspect of that right.2 Not until 1967
did the Court hold that the guarantee is one of those "fundamental"
rights binding on the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.8 Barker v. Wingo4 stands as the first attempt by the
Court to speak comprehensively to the question of speedy trial, and to
develop guidelines by which the right is to be measured.5
Petitioner Willie Mae Barker was convicted of the murder of an
elderly couple in the Circuit Court of Christian County, Kentucky, five
years and sixteen prosecution-requested continuances after his indict-
ment for the crime in September 1958. 6 Barker failed to object to the
1 See, e.g., United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (sixth amendment right at-
taches only after arrest or indictment); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970) (seven year
delay held to require dismissal of charges when defendant available for trial at all times
and prejudice shown); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (state has duty to make dili-
gent, good faith effort to bring prisoner in another jurisdiction to trial); Klopfer v. North
Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (sixth amendment right to speedy trial fundamental and
binding on states through fourteenth amendment); United States v. Ewell, 883 U.S. 116
(1966) (delay due to retrial after reversal of conviction not ordinarily violation of sixth
amendment); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 554 (1957) (delay in sentencing not per se
violation of sixth amendment when promptly corrected on discovery); Beavers v. Haubert,
198 U.S. 77 (1905) (sixth amendment does not require that multiple offenses be tried in
order indictments were filed).
2 See note 1 supra. This piecimeal appr6ach is evident in United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 207 (1971). There the majority held that "it is either a formal indictment or
information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a crim-
inal charge that engage the particular protections of the speedy trial provisions of the
Sixth Amendment." Id. at 220. This inflexible approach generated a strong dissent from
Justice Douglas, in which he was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Citing Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which extended other sixth amendment protections to
preindictment situations, the minority argued for an ad hoc approach to the sixth amend-
ment, focusing on "the nature of the event and its effect on the rights involved." Id. at
833. This method of analysis foreshadowed that of the unanimous Court in Barker.
3 Klopfer v. North Carolina, 886 U.S. 213 (1967).
4 407 U.S. 514 (1972), af'g 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'g Civ. No. 2046 (W.D. Ky.
June 1, 1970).
5 The Court in Barker acknowledged Justice Brennan's observation in Dickey v.
Florida, 898 U.S. 30, 40-41 (1970); that no previous Supreme Court decision had delineated
a single set of criteria for measuring the right to a speedy trial. His concern prompted him
to make an extended individual analysis of the right in that decision. Id. at 41-56.
6 407 U.S. at 516-18.
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first eleven continuances until he moved to dismiss the indictment in
February 1962. The motion was denied. Barker did not renew this ob-
jection to the thirteenth and fourteenth continuances which were
granted in June and September of 1962. The prosecution had requested
the first fourteen delays in order to permit it to first try Barker's alleged
accomplice whose testimony it considered vital to Barker's conviction.7
The accomplice was finally convicted in December 1962,8 but two more
continuances were ordered due to the illness of the chief investigator, an
ex-sheriff. 9 When trial was finally commenced on October 9, 1963,
Barker again moved for dismissal, specifically relying on his right to a
speedy trial. The motion was denied; the trial began and Barker was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 10 On appeal Barker
again advanced his speedy trial claim; the conviction was affirmed. 1 Six
years later, in February 1970, the District Court for the Western District
of Kentucky denied Barker's petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which
was based on speedy trial grounds; the decision of the district court was
affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.'8
The practical effects of the Barker opinion can perhaps be under-
stood by contrasting the Supreme Court's treatment of the facts with
the treatment afforded by the Sixth Circuit.14
The Sixth Circuit found that Barker had waived any claim based
on denial of a speedy trial prior to February 1963, the date of his first
objection. 5 The court went on to hold that the remaining delay was
not unduly long and that it was attributable to an excusable cause-
the illness of the ex-sheriff.1' Finally, finding that Barker had failed to
carry the burden of establishing prejudice to his defense,17 the court
denied his petition.
7 Id. at 516. The prosecution felt that by first convicting the accomplice, self-
incrimination hurdles to the use of his testimony against Barker would be removed. Id.
8 The effort to convict the accomplice extended through two reversals (Manning v.
Commonwealth, 328 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1959) (admission of evidence from illegal search);
Manning v. Commonwealth, 346 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1961) (improper denial of request for
change of venue)) and two hung juries before its ultimate success in March 1962 as to one
victim, and December 1962 as to the other. 407 U.S. at 517.
9 407 U.S. at 517-18.
10 Id. at 518.
11 Barker v. Commonwealth, 385 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1964).
12 442 F.2d. 1141 (6th Cir. 1971).
13 404 U.S. 1037 (1971).
14 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971).
15 Id. at 1143. This finding was factually incorrect. Barker first objected in February
1962. 407 US. at 518-19.
16 442 F.2d at 1144.
17 Id. at 1143-44.
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Unlike the Circuit Court, the Supreme Court took into considera-
tion the entire length of delay, more than five years, which it charac-
terized as "extraordinary."18 Nor did the Court accept the Sixth Cir-
cuit's determination that the delay was excusable. With the exception
of the seven month delay attributable to the illness of the ex-sheriff, the
Court found the explanations advanced by the prosecution unpersua-
sive.19 Although the Court noted that some delay for the purpose of
securing the testimony of Barker's accomplice would be permissible, it
criticized the fact that much of this delay was caused by retrials neces-
sitated by the state's failure to try the accomplice consonant with due
process.20
Two factors, however, weighed heavily against Barker. Of crucial
importance was the Court's contlusion that Barker did not wish to be
tried.21 This was inferred from Barker's failure to object for nearly
three and a half years, and from his failure to renew the motion until
his accomplice was finally convicted.22 Second, prejudice was considered
to be minimal since there was no claim of injury to the defendant's
ability to mount a defense.2 After considering these factors, the Court
concluded that the decision of the Sixth Circuit should be affirmed,
although it called the case "close." 24
The Court reasoned that a sixth amendment speedy trial claim
must be decided by using a balancing test which includes at least four
factors: the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of his right, and the prejudice to the defendant.25 The Court
stressed that these are only factors, and that no one of them standing
alone is "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a
deprivation of the right of speedy trial." 26 Furthermore, these factors
are not exclusive; they are to be "considered together with such other
circumstances as may be relevant."-27
18 407 U.S. at 533.
19 Id. at 534.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 534-36.
23 Id. at 534.
24 Id. at 533.
25 Id. at 530.
26 Id. at 533.
27 Id. It is difficult to imagine other relevant circumstances which could not be sub-
sumed under one of the four broad headings the Court set out. This language seems to
be merely another example of the desire of the Court to retain judicial flexibility in the
speedy trial area, a desire which is evidenced throughout the entire opinion.
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FAcTORS IN THE BALANCE
The factors which the Court indicates should be weighed in the
balance are not in themselves innovative; they represent a recognition
of the considerations which lower courts have frequently weighed in
evaluating speedy trial claims.2 8 However, the Court's comments as to
what elements must be considered within each broad category, and
their relative weight, will have a lasting impact on both state and fed-
eral criminal practice. 9
A. Length of Delay
The current state of the law with respect to this first factor is
aptly described by the Supreme Court's observation in Beavers v. Hau-
bert3° that "[t]he right of a speedy trial is necessarily relative. It is con-
sistent with delays and depends upon circumstances."3' Recognizing
the imprecision of this approach, a number of states, by court rules 2
or statutes, 33 have prescribed time limits within which accused persons
must be brought to trial. This approach is recommended by the Amer-
ican Bar Association. 34 On the federal level, time limits will soon be
required in every district under the new Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.3 5
Although it has affirmatively required the federal courts to adopt
28 See, e.g., Buatte v. United States, 350 F.2d 389, 394 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
385 U.S. 856 (1966); United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 983 (1965); United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963);
State v. Ball, 277 N.C. 714, 717, 178 S.E.2d 377, 380 (1971); cf. Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S.
30, 48 (1970) (concurring opinion). See also Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial,
57 COLUM. L. Ray. 846, 863-67 (1957); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REv.
476, 478 (1968).
29 For example, the demand-waiver rule has been held unconstitutional. See notes
53-62 and accompanying text infra.
30 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
81 Id. at 87.
32 See, e.g., ARiz. R. CQM. P. 236; FLA. R. CalM. P. 3.191; IND. R. CauM. P. 4; N.M.R.
Civ. P. 95. See also note 33 infra.
33 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1970); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-05 (Smith-
Hurd 1970); IoWA CODE ANN. § 795.2 (Supp. 1972); NEV. REy. STAT. § 178.556 (1969); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 781 (1964); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.46.010 (1961); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 971.10 (1971). State court rules (see note 32 supra) and a majority of these state statutes
are collected and discussed in Note, Speedy Trial Schemes and Criminal Justice Delay, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 794 (1972).
84 ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
To SPEEDY TRIAL 14 (1968).
35 Recently approved Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 50(b), effective October 1,
1972, orders each district court to prepare a plan for the prompt disposition of its criminal
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specific time limits under the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court in
Barker declined to extend such a requirement to the states under con-
stitutional aegis, noting that
[s]uch a result would require this Court to engage in legislative or
rulemaking activity, rather than in the adjudicative process to
which we should confine our efforts. We do not establish procedural
rules for the States, except when mandated by the Constitution.
We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial
right can be quantified into a specified number of days or months.36
The Court did, however, recognize the propriety of time limits estab-
lished by state statutes or court rules.37
In addition, the Court suggested that length of delay occupies a
unique position in the balancing process. It compared the factor to a
"triggering mechanism"; unless the reviewing court first finds that the
delay which has occurred is prima facie unreasonable-in the Court's
words, "presumptively prejudicial" 38-it need not inquire further.3 9
The Court also suggested that the primary variable in determining the
caseload. This plan must include time limits within which pre-trial procedures, the trial
itself, and sentencing are to take place, Under 50(b), each district is required, within 90
days of the effective date of the rule, to submit its plan to a reviewing panel for approval.
The reviewing panel will consist of the judicial council of the circuit, and either the chief
judge of the district whose plan is being reviewed or such other acting judge in the dis-
trict as the chief judge may designate. The rule also provides for a continuing study of
the issue and subsequent revision of the plans submitted.
36 407 US. at 523. However, Judge J. Skely Wxight, concurring in Nickens v. United
States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir, 1965), although not arguing for the imposition of specific
time limits, presented a strong argument for the imposition of minimum constitutional
standards. Judge Wright noted that
[t]he legislature is free to implement the constitutional right and to provide
protections greater than the constitutional right. But the minimum right of the
accused to a speedy trial is preserved by the command of the Sixth Amendment,
whatever the terms of the statute.
Id. at 813 n.4.
There is also constitutional precedent for the specific quantification of sixth amend-
ment rights. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970), the Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment right to a jury trial could not be denied in any criminal prose-
cution where the maximum penalty exceeded six months imprisonment. It should be
noted, however, that the Court was heavily influenced in its decision by the fact that
New York City was the only locale with a statute refusing the right to trial by jury for
offenses of this magnitude.
37 "The States, of course, are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with
constitutional standards .... 407 U.S. at 523.
as Id. at 530. The use of this phrase is particularly significant in an analysis of the
Court's fourth factor-prejudice to the defendant. See notes 80-81 and accompanying text
infra.
89 407 US. at 530.
1973]
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amount of delay permissible in a specific case should be the nature and
complexity of the crime charged.40
B. Reasons for the Delay
The second factor in the balance has traditionally been composed
of the following subclasses: delay attributable to the defendant's ac-
tions, delay purposefully and oppressively caused by the prosecution,
and so-called "neutral reasons" for delay, encompassing such diverse
causes as court congestion and negligence on the part of the prosecu-
tion.41
Delay attributable to the actions of the defense has presented no
problem for the courts; the defendant must bear the consequences of
delay for which he is responsible. 42 This view was explicitly approved in
Barker.43 However, the prevailing interpretation has been that a de-
fendant must also shoulder the burden of delay from neutral sources;44
he can only claim the benefit of delay resulting from purposeful and
40 Until there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no neces-
sity of inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless, be-
cause of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of delay that
will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon the peculiar circum-
stances of the case. To take but one example, the delay that can be tolerated for
an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex con-
spiracy charge.
Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted).
Justice Douglas, concurring in United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), had earlier
expounded this theme. Speaking of the facts of that case, he said:
If this were a simpler crime, I think the British precedent which I have cited
would warrant dismissal of the indictment because of the speedy trial guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment. But we know from experience that the nature of the
crime charged here [conspiracy to commit fraud] often has vast interstate aspects,
the victims are often widely scattered and hard to locate, and the reconstruction
of the total scheme of the fraudulent plan takes time. If we applied the simpler
rule that was applied in simpler days, we would be giving extraordinary advan-
tages to organized crime as well as others who use a farflung complicated network
to perform their illegal activities.
Id. at 335.
Some speedy trial rules distinguish between types of crimes. See, e.g., FLA. R. CraM. P.
3.191 (felony: 180 days; misdemeanor: 90 days). See also Note, supra note 33, at 804 nn.
45-51.
41 See Note, supra note 28, 57 CoLuM. L. Rv. at 856-59; Note, supra note 28, 20 STAN.
L. REv. at 480-81.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
880 (1958) (delay due primarily to defendant's motions held not to violate right of speedy
trial).
43 "We hardly need add that if delay is attributable to the defendant, then his waiver
may be given effect under standard waiver doctrine ... " 407 U.S. at 529.
44 King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959) (five
month delay due to congested criminal calendar); People v. Ganci, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267
N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1971) (16 month delay primarily due to court congestion).
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oppressive acts of the prosecution.4 5 The obvious harshness of this rule,
wliich charges the defendant with delay due not only to circumstances
beyond his control but with that created by his adversary, the state,
has come under attack,46 and is reflected in at least one formal speedy
trial scheme. 47
The handling of trial delay caused by overcrowded court dockets
has already become a significant issue in speedy trial litigation and
promises to assume even greater importance as the workload of courts
increases. 48 But the Court in Barker declined to take an affirmative
stand against delay due to court congestion. Although it endorsed in
principle the argument that court congestion is the ultimate respon-
sibility of the state49 and held that delay due to such congestion must
45 Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957). See United States v. Marion, 404
US. 307, 325 (1971) (intentional acts by prosecution to harass defendants or gain tactical
advantage over them impermissible). But on the issue of negligent prosecutorial delay, see
Hanrahan v. United States, 348 F.2d 363, 368 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United States v. Reed, 285
F. Supp. 738, 741 (D.D.C. 1968).
46 Smith v. United States, 331 F.2d 784, 787-89 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (en banc) (dissenting
opinion). In King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 US. 998
(1959), the circuit court, although denying petitioner's speedy trial claim on the merits,
stated:
Cases have to take their turn. The case on trial is entitled to deliberate considera-
tion; the others on the calendar stack up. At the same time, too much heed to
practicalities may encroach upon the individual's rights. If the legislature were
to refuse to install sufficient judicial machinery to perform the judicial tasks, it
might be necessary to turn some accused persons loose.
Id. at 569.
Dissenting in People v. Gand, 27 N.Y.2d 418, 267 N.E.2d 263, 318 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1971),
Chief Judge Fuld was even more direct:
[I]t is the responsibility of the State, or of its subdivisions, to do what is neces-
sary-by furnishing funds, facilities and personnel-to assure the effective opera-
tion of the judicial system, and that burden may not be shifted to the defendant.
The rule is simply stated; constitution and statutes mandate a speedy trial, and
it is incumbent on the State to provide it.
Id. at 430-31, 267 N.E.2d at 270, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
47 FLA. R. CPIm. P. 3.191(f) (congestion of court docket specifically excluded from ex-
ceptional circumstances extension).
48 In 1970 there were 38,102 criminal cases filed in the federal district courts, repre-
senting a 13% increase in a single year. JuDIcIAL CONFERaENCE OF THE UNrrE STATES, AN-
NUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISFRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS:
1970, at 144 (1971). Although the number of cases completed in 1970 was the highest since
1955, it was less than the number of filings; thus, the number of cases pending in 1970
rose to 20,910, an 18% increase over 1969. Id. at 145. An "emergency" situation has thus
been created in six federal judicial districts. In those districts, more than 30% of the
criminal cases have been pending one year or longer. Id. at 155-56.
49 "The rule we announce today, which comports with constitutional principles, places
the primary burden on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought to
trial." 407 US. at 529. One must question the extent to which the Court has fully em-
braced the concept of "affirmative duty" in view of its tacit approval of delay due to court
congestion.
1973]
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be given consideration in any balancing formula, it undermined the
force of this position by adding that this type of "neutral reason ...
should be weighed less heavily."50 Thus, a court evaluating a speedy
trial claim may no longer ignore delay due to court congestion entirely;
however, it is given broad discretion as to the weight which should be
attached to such consideration.
This failure to deal positively with delay caused by court conges-
tion sparked the only visible hint of dissent in an otherwise unanimous
Court. Justice White, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Bren-
nan,51 forcefully asserted that "only special circumstances presenting
a more pressing public need with respect to the case itself should suffice
to justify delay." 52
C. Defendant's Assertion of the Right
The demand-waiver rule has been followed in most of the states;
and in a majority of the federal circuits.54 Briefly stated, the rule re-
quires that a defendant raising a sixth amendment speedy trial claim
have previously made a demand for trial. Even after this demand has
been made, the defendant is deemed to have waived objection to any
delay occurring prior to the demand.55 The rule is based on the assump-
tions that delay often works to the benefit of defendants56 and that
failure to demand or to object is equivalent to acquiescence.57 Thus, it
follows that a defendant should not be permitted to benefit from a delay
to which he presumably acquiesced to his own advantage. Concurring
50 Id. at 531.
51 Id. at 536-38.
52 Id. at 537 (emphasis added). Justice White also directed the Court's attention to
its own observation that permitting a lack of public resources to excuse delay "subverts the
State's own goals in seeking to enforce its criminal laws." Id. at 538.
53 E.g., Randolph v. State, 234 Ind. 57, 122 N.E.2d 860 (1954), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
889 (1955). This rule is embraced even in some states with speedy trial statutes. See, e.g.,
State v. Christensen, 75 Wash. 2d 678, 684, 453 P.2d 644, 648 (1969). Other states, however,
have rejected the doctrine. See, e.g., Rutherford v. State, 486 P.2d 946 (Alas. 1971); State
v. Hess, 180 Kan. 472, 304 P.2d 474 (1956); People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891
(1955).
54 E.g., Barker v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1141 (6th Cir. 1971), aff'd on other grounds, 407
U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Perez, 398 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 Us.
1080 (1969); United States v. Hill, 310 F.2d 601 (4th Cir. 1962). But cf. Bandy v. United
States, 408 F.2d 518 (8th Cir. 1969). Barker itself discusses the approach of individual states
and federal circuits to the demand-waiver rule. 407 US. at 524-25.
55 407 U.S. at 525.
56 United States ex rel. Von Cseh v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963). There the court
noted that "[s]uch a rule is based on the almost universal experience that delay in criminal
cases is welcomed by defendants as it usually operates in their favor." Id. at 623 (footnote
omitted).
57 E.g., Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1946).
[Vol. 58:399
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
in Dickey v. Florida,"8 however, Justice Brennan questioned this ra-
tionale, arguing that
[i]t is possible that the implication of waiver from silence or inac-
tion misallocates the burden of ensuring a speedy trial. The ac-
cused has no duty to bring on his trial. He is presumed innocent
until proved guilty; arguably, he should be presumed to wish
to exercise his right to be tried quickly, unless he affirmatively ac-
cepts delay. 9
Although it rejected strict application of the demand-waiver rule as
"inconsistent with this Court's pronouncements on waiver of constitu-
tional rights," 60 the Court in Barker stated that inaction on the part
of the defendant will serve to raise a strong presumption of consent:
"[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant to
prove that he was denied a speedy trial."61 The Court's examples of
situations in which the presumption of waiver might be overcome sug-
gest that waiver will not be implied primarily in situations in which
the defendant did not have a legally sufficient opportunity to object.0 2
The Court also injected a new element into the consideration of
defendant's conduct-the frequency and force of his objections.6
Under the traditional demand-waiver rule, any demand for trial was
sufficient to toll the operation of the waiver.6 But under Barker, the
strength and number of defendant's efforts become material to the
58 398 U.S. 80, 59-57 (1970).
59 Id. at 50.
60 407 U.S. at 525. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 804 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (waiver is "inten-
tional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege"); Aetna Ins. Co. v.
Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937) (courts should "indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver"). More directly in point is Carnley v. Cochran, 369 US. 506 (1962). There
the Supreme Court stated: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible." Id.
at 516.
61 407 U.S. at 532.
02 The Court suggested exceptions to the demand requirement when the accused has
not been represented by counsel (id. at 529), has been represented by incompetent counsel,
has been severely prejudiced by the delay, or when continuances were granted to the prose-
cution ex parte. Id. at 536. Exceptions of this type had often been recognized under prior
law. See, e.g., People v. Wyatt, 24 Ill. 2d 151, 180 N.E.2d 478 (1962) (since defendant not
represented by counsel, held not responsible for delay proposed by court to which he
acquiesced). But see United States v. Perez, 398 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1080 (1969) (waiver found although defendant not represented by counsel or informed
by court of his right to speedy trial).
63 407 U.S. at 529.
04 See Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947) (some kind of effort
to secure speedy trial); State v. Murdock, 235 Md. 116, 122, 200 A.2d 666, 669 (1964) (dictum)
(oral or written request to any judge in county sufficient demand). But see People v. Dun-
can, 373 Mich. 650, 653, 180 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1964) (formal record demand required to
invoke constitutional guarantee).
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success of his claim; the frequency and force with which the right is
asserted serve as a barometer of prejudice to the defendant, which
often cannot be adequately expressed in the record.65 The Court in
Barker based its conclusion that the defendant did not really want to
be tried not only on his failure to make an objection for three and a
half years, but also on his failure to renew his objection upon notice of
the prosecution's motions for two additional continuances. In fact, the
defendant did not raise another objection until his accomplice had
finally been convicted. 66
D. Prejudice
The position taken by the Court on the prejudice factor is unclear.
Controversy over the issue of prejudice has centered on two areas: the
type of detriment which should be considered prejudicial in the consti-
tutional sense,67 and the allocation of the burden of establishing the
existence or absence of such prejudice in the defendant's case.68
These issues have often been resolved adversely to the defendant.
Traditionally, only detriment to the defendant's ability to mount a
defense, such as a lost witness, was considered constitutionally prejudi-
cial.69 However, in United States v. Ewell,70 the Supreme Court recog-
nized certain other sources of prejudice: pre-trial incarceration, or, if
the defendant was released on bond, restraints on his liberty, and the
hostility and suspicion of the community.71 Barker explicitly re-empha-
sized these factors as legitimate elements of prejudice,72 and suggested
that they could be measured by the quantity and quality of defendant's
65 407 U.S. at 531.
66 Id. at 534-36.
67 See notes 69-75 and accompanying text infra.
68 See notes 76-81 and accompanying text infra.
69 King v. United States, 265 F.2d 567, 570 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 998 (1959)
(hardship not sufficient showing of prejudice without specific prejudice to defense); United
States v. Verville, 281 F. Supp. 591, 593 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (only detriment to defense's case
prejudicial in the constitutional sense).
70 383 U.S. 116 (1966).
71 This guarantee [speedy trial] is an important safeguard to prevent undue and
oppressive incarceration prior to trial, to minimize anxiety and concern accom-
panying public accusation and to limit the possibilities that long delay will impair
the ability of an accused to defend himself.
Id. at 120.
72 In Barker the Court also emphasized the prejudice to society which stems from ex-
cessive delay. Specifically, trial delay encourages plea-bargaining and undermines rehabili-
tation of the criminal after he is convicted. If the defendant is released on bond, he may
commit other crimes or jump bail. If he must await trial in jail, the cost is even greater;
in addition to the direct cost of maintaining prisons and the indirect cost of increased
social welfare to dependents, trial delay may have a destructive effect on the defendant's
character, particularly when he has not yet been convicted. 407 U.S. at 519-21.
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assertion of the right as weU as by direct evidence.73 However, the Court
added the caveat that impairment of the defendant's substantive de-
fense remains the most serious type of prejudice.74
The secondary status of prejudice which does not impair the defen-
dant's substantive defense is confirmed by the Court's analysis of
Barker's own claim. The Court found that although Barker spent ten
months in jail and was on bail for more than four years prior to trial,
the resultant prejudice to him was "minimal" because he did not allege
the loss of any witness and losses of memory were minor.75 This treat-
ment makes it difficult to conceive of circumstances where personal
prejudice, not coupled with a claim of substantial impairment to the
defense, might alone be sufficient to establish a claim of prejudice.
Allocation of the burden of proof can also be crucial to, even deter-
minative of, the issue of prejudice. There are obvious difficulties in
establishing that a witness's memory has faded or in proving that the
loss of one's job was a result of a pending indictment."6 Although proof
of prejudice has usually been considered an element of the defendant's
case,77 some courts have shifted the burden to the government in cases
of extreme delay.78 This second view is more consistent with the state's
affirmative duty to bring the defendant to trial. 9 It follows that where
undue delay has occurred, the state should have the burden of proving
that the defendant has not suffered from its failure to discharge this
duty.
73 See notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
74 407 U.S. at 532.
75 Id. at 534.
76 See, e.g., Bynum v. United States, 408 F.2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 894
U.S. 935 (1969) (lack of proof of prejudice held to defeat speedy trial claim despite prima
facie showing of undue delay).
The Barker opinion also recognizes the practical problems of proof: "There is also
prejudice if defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past.
Loss of memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has been for-
gotten can rarely be shown." 407 U.S. at 532. The Court's solution was to permit extrinsic
evidence, such as the frequency and force of defendant's objections, to serve as a substitute
for direct evidence on this point. See generally notes 65-66 and accompanying text supra.
77 See United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 122-23 (1966); United States ex rel. Von
Cseh v. Fay, 313 F,2d 620, 624 (2d Cir. 1963). Contra, United States v. Lustman, 258 F.2d
475 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958). In Lustman the court held that "a showing
of prejudice is not required when a criminal defendant is asserting a constitutional right
under the Sixth Amendment." 258 F.2d at 478.
78 United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp. 230 (N.D. IH. 1955) (21 year delay); Petition of
Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md.), af'd mem., 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (six year delay). Contra,
United States ex rel. Pierce v. Lane, 302 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1962) (prejudice not presumed
from 18 year delay).
79 See Note, supra note 28, 20 STAN. L. Rzv. at 493-97.
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The Court's position in Barker on the burden of proof issue is
far from explicit. By characterizing delay sufficient to support a speedy
trial claim as "presumptively prejudicial,"' 0 it appears to sanction the
placing of this burden on the government. Subsequent language, how-
ever, although not necessarily inconsistent with this view, tends to
suggest the opposite conclusion."'
II
COLLATERAL ISSUES CONSIDERED iN Barker
The Barker opinion implicitly decided two other points of law
relating to speedy trial. First, by applying sixth amendment criteria to
Barker, who was convicted by a Kentucky state court in 1963,2 the
Court necessarily gave retroactive effect to Klopfer v. North Carolina,8
the 1967 case which imposed this sixth amendment obligation on the
states. 14
Second, in its discussion of a possible remedy, the Court stated
that the denial of a speedy trial
leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the in-
dictment .... This is indeed a serious consequence because it
means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious crime will
go free, without having been tried. Such a remedy is more serious
than an exclusionary rule or a reversal for a new trial, but it is the
only possible remedy.B5
This language strongly implies that dismissal of an indictment or re-
versal of a conviction on speedy trial grounds bars subsequent re-indict-
80 407 US. at 580.
81 In finding the prejudice to Barker to be "minimal," the Court emphasized that
there was no daim that any of his witnesses had died or otherwise become unavailable.
Id. at 534. This strongly suggests that a defendant has at least the obligation to plead the
circumstances of any detriment to his substantive defense. This language can be read con-
sistently with the presumption of prejudice, however, by separating the burden of plead-
ing from the burden of proof. Once a defendant has raised the issue of prejudice, it would
become the duty of the prosecution to prove that substantial prejudice had not in fact
occurred. Such an approach has substantial merit in that it requires the defendant, who
has unique knowledge of the prejudice he has in fact suffered, to frame this issue. At the
same time, it does not place on him the harsh burden of proving prejudice which it was
beyond his control to prevent.
82 Barker v. Wingo, 442 F.2d 1141, 1142 (6th Cir. 1971).
83 886 US. 213 (1967).
84 Klopfer itself did not consider the issue of retroactivity. See also Dickey v. Florida,
398 U.S. 80, 39 (1970).
85 407 U.S. at 522 (footnote omitted).
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ment for the same offense, a point on which there has been some con-
flict of authority.8 6
III
CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING THE OPINION
The "criteria" for determining speedy trial claims promulgated in
Barker are quite nebulous.87 The practical effect of the case, except in
those jurisdictions strictly adhering to the demand-waiver rule,88 is to
place the Court's imprimatur on virtually every speedy trial test now
in use. Some of the underlying considerations which influenced the
Court to adopt this approach are suggested by its discussion of the
unique characteristics of the right to speedy trial.8 9
Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, identified three "generic
differences" between speedy trial and other constitutional protections
afforded the accused. One of these is that delay often works to the
benefit of the accused.9 0 This, of course, is the classic rationale for the
demand-waiver rule,91 and undoubtedly influenced the Court's decision
to retain defendant's assertion of the right as a factor to be weighed in
evaluating his claim, even though the waiver effect has been elimi-
nated.92 Although this view of demand has validity in instances of
defense-caused delay, it does not meet Justice Brennan's contention in
Dickey that a defendant should not suffer where his only contribution
to the delay was failure to object. 93 The Court also implied that demand
is relevant to the issue of prejudice. 4 The Court concluded that since
the net consequence of delay may be a benefit to the defendant, denial
of the speedy trial right cannot be deemed prejudicial to the defendant
as a matter of law.9- This reasoning is not entirely persuasive. Although
the prosecution's case can undoubtedly be weakened by delay, it does
not follow that this should diminish the legal effect of prejudice to the
86 See Mann v. United States, 304 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1962); People v. Hernandez, 250
Cal. App. 2d 842, 58 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1967) (reindictment not barred). But see People v.
Prosser, 309 N.Y. 353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955).
87 A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial cases on an ad
hoc basis.
88 See notes 53-54 and accompanying text supra.
89 407 U.S. at 519-22.
90 Id. at 521.
91 See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
92 See notes 60-62 and accompanying text supra.
93 See text accompanying note 59 supra.
94 407 US. at 521.
95 Id.
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defendant where the defendant has not caused the delay. The Court
overlooks situations in which the state has ultimate control over the
means of preventing the delay. 6
Another unique aspect of the right to a speedy trial is its relative
vagueness when compared with other procedural rights. 97 It is difficult
to determine the point at which the right is denied in a given case, let
alone to promulgate a rule which will do justice in all future cases.9s
Furthermore, a speedy trial may at times be antagonistic to other con-
stitutional protections in a criminal justice system where deliberation
and procedural safeguards are highly prized. Indeed, some have sought
to use the right to a speedy trial as justification for an attack on other
constitutional safeguards for the accused.9  The latitude which Barker
allows reviewing courts evaluating speedy trial claims is a manifestation
of the inherent vagueness of the right.
This unique feature of the right may have caused the Court's
failure to act more affirmatively in the area of length of delay, although
the Court assigned limits on its constitutional power as the reason.100 A
rule such as that embraced by the District of Columbia Circuit, which
considers speedy trial claims based on more than a year's delay to have
prima facie, though rebuttable, merit,101 would be particularly useful
in jurisdictions which have not established specific time limits through
speedy trial statutes or court rules. Yet the Supreme Court insisted on
keeping the time limit totally dependent on the merits of each par-
ticular case.
The deprivation of the right of a speedy trial requires a more
drastic remedy than does denial of other procedural rights, and it is
obvious that the Court is deeply concerned with this problem.102 While
other procedural defects can be corrected at a new trial, denial of
96 See notes 79-81 and accompanying text supra.
07 407 US. at 521.
98 Id.
99 For example, in Senate hearings on a proposed speedy trial bill, Assistant Attorney
General, now Supreme Court Justice, William H. Rehnquist testified that the Department
of Justice's approval of the bill was conditioned on the enactment of "additional provisions
directed towards the attainment of the end of prompt dispensation we all seek." Hearings
on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 107 (1971). His specific suggestions included a statutory modi-
fication of the exclusionary rule (id. at 107-08), and bar of post-conviction claims based on
Miranda. Id. at 107-14.
100 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
101 Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F.2d 684, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Accord, Harling v.
United States, 401 F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1068 (1969).
102 407 U.S. at 522.
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a speedy trial requires that the defendant go free without being tried. 03
The Court's explicit characterization of the necessary remedy as "un-
satisfactorily severe"'104 suggests that this consideration may have in-
fluenced the Court to refrain from announcing a constitutional rule
which might exceed the capacity, or willingness, of some states to
implement.105
An additional generic difference between the right to a speedy
trial and an accused's other constitutional protections is the existence
of a societal interest in enforcing the right "which exists separate from
and at times in opposition to the interests of the accused."' 1 6 Although
all such rights are supported by a general concern that criminal de-
fendants be treated fairly, speedy trial protects other, more concrete
public interests as well. Effective enforcement of the speedy trial right
might minimize the effectiveness of a defendant's efforts to plea bargain,
and would reduce his opportunity to commit other crimes while free
on bond. 07 Further, although the point was not mentioned by the
Court in Barker, effective enforcement of the right would greatly
diminish the force of arguments for preventive detention. 08
103 Id. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
The Court did not discuss another recognized remedy for denial of the right of speedy
trial-the writ of mandamus to compel trial. Prior to 1938, a number of courts consid-
ered this the only remedy for denial of the right:
[We think an accused would not be entitled to a discharge even though he were
denied a speedy trial within the meaning of the Constitution. His right and only
remedy would be to apply to the proper appellate court for a writ of mandamus
to compel trial.
Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F.2d 796, 798 (8th Cir. 1925) (dictum). But see MacKnight v.
United States, 263 F. 832 (1st Cir. 1920). However, this remedy has fallen into disuse with
the advent of the federal rule which provides:
If there is unnecessary delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or in filing
an information against a defendant who has been held to answer to the district
court, or if there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the court
may dismiss the indictment, information or complaint.
FED. R. CRim. P. 48(b).
104 407 U.S. at 522.
105 If the Court had adopted a more affirmative stance in Barker, this concern might
have been ameliorated by an appropriate delay in implementation. Any major broadening
of constitutional rights necessarily entails adjustment on the part of the instrumentalities
of government charged with their enforcement. The Court has often attempted to cushion
this dislocation in its consideration of remedy. For example, the rule announced in Mi-
randa v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was held to apply only to trials beginning after June
13, 1966. The Second Circuit followed a similar approach with its speedy trial rules, de-
laying their enforcement for six months to give the government time to develop and im-
plement procedures for compliance. 2D Cm. RULEs REGARINo THE PRoMPT DxsposrrIoN OF
CRm. CASES.
106 407 US. at 519.
'07 Id. at 519-21. See note 72 supra.
108 See Note, supra note 33, at 824.
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However, it is this societal interest which is least served by the
factors developed in the Barker opinion. For example, although noting
that the drastic action of dismissal is the "only possible remedy"' 09 for
the denial of a speedy trial, the Court conditioned the availability of
this remedy on the "defendant's assertion of the right."'10 The right
was so conditioned despite the Court's recognition that defendants as a
class usually welcome delay,"' and that society's interest in speedy trial
may work "in opposition to the interests of the accused."" 12
CONCLUSION
The Court in Barker announced that it had placed "the primary
burden on the courts and the prosecutors to assure that cases are brought
to trial."113 However, the Court failed in several important respects to
take the steps necessary to achieve this objective.114
If Barker can be read primarily as a recognition of the constitu-
tional importance of a speedy trial and as an encouragement to the
states to develop individual plans to implement the speedy trial
guarantee, the Court's refusal to pre-empt state initiative by mandating
a precise, constitutional plan has substantial merit. But this inter-
pretation imposes a continuing obligation on the Court. Should the
states fail to act within a reasonable time, the Court should be pre-
pared to intervene. And should state legislative abdication be ac-
companied by a failure to provide sufficient judicial resources for the
administration of criminal justice, intervention may include the im-
position of mechanisms to overcome the greatest practical bar to full
realization of the speedy trial right---court congestion.115 If, on the
109 407 U.S. at 522.
110 Id. at 531-82. See notes 60-66 and accompanying text supra.
Ill 407 U.S. at 521.
112 Id. at 519. Similarly, the emphasis on prejudice to the defendant obscures the
equally important, and independent, sources of prejudice to society when the right is
denied. See text accompanying note 115 infra.
118 407 U.S. at 529.
114 See notes 36-37, 48-52, 77-81 and accompanying text supra.
115 There is a small but growing body of precedent for the proposition that courts
have the power to compel adequate financing for their operations where the legislative
branch has failed to provide it. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 1971
upheld a mandamus proceeding by a Philadelphia common pleas court to compel city
officials to allocate additional funds for the administration of the court. Commonwealth
ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, 442 Pa. 45, 274 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971). See Note,
supra note 33, at 820; cf. Note, Judicial Financial Autonomy and Inherent Power, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 975 (1972).
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized the problem: "Delay, for ex-
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other hand, Barker stands for the proposition that the right to a speedy
trial must ultimately depend on demand and prejudice to the de-
fendant, then the case may be properly criticized for failing to provide
adequate protection for this fundamental right.
Charles P. Schropp
ample, may spring from a refusal by other branches of government to provide . .. the
judiciary with the resources necessary for speedy trials." Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 51
(1970) (concurring opinion). However, the Court's ultimate solution to the problem remains
to be determined.
International Law-COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS-ENFORCING CHOICE OF
FORUM AND EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972)
In both domestic and international transactions, the contracting
parties often designate a particular forum in which all disputes be-
tween them are to be adjudicated. Once a dispute arises, however, the
aggrieved party frequently disregards the choice of forum clause' and
brings suit in a different jurisdiction. When the defendant pleads the
choice of forum clause as a jurisdictional defect, the court is faced with
the need to determine the clause's validity. On this issue the courts are
divided. Some view the choice of forum agreement as an attempt by
the parties to deprive the court of its jurisdiction.2 These courts con-
sider the choice of forum clause invalid per se as against public policy.,
On the other hand, a growing number of jurisdictions treat the choice
of forum clause as within the contractual capacity of the parties and
thus hold it void only if it is unreasonable.4 These courts measure the
1 No attempt is made herein to distinguish choice of forum agreements made prior
to a controversy from agreements made after a cause of action has accrued.
2 See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir.),
cert. granted, 358 US. 809 (1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959); Wood & Selick, Inc.
v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930); Nashua River Paper
Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co., 223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916); Kyler v. United States
Trotting Ass'n, 12 App. Div. 2d 874, 219 N.Y.S2d 25, appeal denied, 12 App. Div. 2d 1004,
212 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (4th Dep't 1961).
a The public policy considerations underlying judicial reluctance to honor choice
of forum agreements were first discussed in a pair of early Massachusetts cases. In Nute v.
Hamilton Mutual Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 174 (1856), the Massachusetts Supreme Court
determined that the plaintiff's choice of forum is a matter inextricably bound to the
concept of remedy. While willing to concede that the contracting parties had the power
to regulate certain areas of controversy, the court held that any "remedial issues" were
matters of law and, as such, remained exclusively within the province of the judiciary.
The parties created and maintained contractual rights between them, but upon breach
only the courts could enforce those rights. Id. at 180. The law was viewed as transcending
the will of the contracting parties. Even though their agreement was ended by breach,
the court would be able to provide a remedy for the injured party. Id. In a companion
case, Hall v. People's Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 185 (1856), the same court
stated its ruling more succinctly. Noting the well-settled doctrine that parties cannot,
by their consent, give the court jurisdiction where the law has not given it, the Massa-
chusetts tribunal reasoned that the parties could not take away jurisdiction where the
law has given it. Id. at 192.
4 See, e.g., Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.
1955); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 209 A.2d 810 (1965).
This approach to the choice of forum clause problem began to emerge at the turn
of the century. In 1903, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Mittenthal v. Mascagni,
183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903), held that a stipulation in a contract giving the Italian
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unreasonableness of the clause by the degree to which its enforcement
would impair the plaintiff's ability to pursue his cause of action.5
When the action is brought in a forum other than that designated
in the contract, the theory applied in a forum-selecting clause contro-
versy is crucial. In an invalid per se jurisdiction the choice of forum
agreement will be ignored and the question of venue will be decided
on grounds of forum non conveniens, thus placing a burden on the de-
fendant to show that the plaintiff's choice of forum is unreasonable.
Unless the evidence is strongly in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff's
selection will rarely be disturbed.6 In a jurisdiction in which the clause
is void only if unreasonable, great weight will be given to the agree-
ment of the contracting parties and the plaintiff will be compelled to
show that the forum designated in the contract is unreasonable.7 These
courts will recognize jurisdiction over the controversy but may prop-
erly decline to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the clause is
courts exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes was not so objectionable on grounds of public
policy that the court would refuse to enforce it. The contract in question, however, was be-
t3veen two Italian citizens, and was to be performed partly in Italy and partly in the United
States. The later Massachusetts case of Nashua River Paper Co. v. Hammermill Paper Co.,
223 Mass. 8, 111 N.E. 678 (1916), emphasized these peculiar facts of the Mittenthal case
and limited its effectiveness as precedent. Although the development of the "reasonable-
ness" test was slowed by Nashua River, Mittenthal had put a chink in the "invalid per se"
armor which would later prove significant.
That significance was first felt in 1949 when Chief Judge Learned Hand, citing
Mittenthal, noted in Krenger v. Pennsylvania R.R., 174 F.2d 556, 561 (2d Cir. 1949) (con-
curring opinion), that there was no longer an uncompromising condemnation of forum
clauses per se, but rather that such agreements were invalid only if unreasonable. The
Chief Judge was forced to confess, however, that judicial hostility toward forum clauses
still existed. Parenthetically it can be noted that Judge Hand's remarks in Krenger came
at a time when greater emphasis was being placed on the parties' right to contract.
Mittenthal v. Mascagni, 183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903), which Hand cites, stated sped-
fically that the modem trend was to permit greater freedom to contracting parties in
matters which formerly were off limits to them. Id. at 23, 66 N.E. at 426.
The influence of Judge Hand's thinking affected the development of the "void only
if unreasonable" doctrine. Courts began to cite his observation as the modem analysis.
See, e.g., Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.
1955) (quoting Hand's analysis); Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa.
122, 133, 209 A.2d 810, 816 (1965):
The modem and correct rule is that, while private parties may not by contract
prevent a court from asserting its jurisdiction or change the rules of venue, never-
theless, a court in which venue is proper and which has jurisdiction should decline
to proceed with the cause when the parties have freely agreed that litigation shall
be conducted in another forum and where such agreement is not unreasonable at
the time of litigation.
5 Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 133, 209 A.2d 810,
816 (1965).
6 E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
7 E.g., Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 134, 209 A.2d
810, 816 (1965).
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reasonable and should be upheld.8 Because substantial contacts fre-
quently exist with both forums, it is normally impossible for either
party to prove a forum unreasonable. Thus, depending upon the theory
applied, one of the litigants will escape the burden of proof and, as a
practical matter, will prevail on the question of proper forum.
Partisans of each theory claim the "correctness"9 or "universal ac-
ceptance"'1 of their own view. The result has been confusion. Thus,
when the Second Circuit utilized the reasonableness test in Win. H.
Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd.,"' and the Fifth Circuit
adopted the per se rule in Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. SS Monrosa,'12
it became evident that the Supreme Court would ultimately be called
on to resolve the controversy. The Supreme Court finally faced the issue
in MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.'8
I
BACKGROUND AND BASIC RATIONALE OF Zapata
Zapata, an American corporation specializing in off-shore oil drill-
ing, contracted with Unterweser, a German corporation and owner
of a deep sea tug, the Bremen.14 Under the terms of the contract, the
Bremen was to tow Zapata's ocean-going drilling rig from Louisiana to
the Adriatic Sea, where Zapata had agreed to drill certain wells. The
contract provided that any dispute was to be brought before the London
Court of Justice.15 In addition to the choice of forum clause, the con-
tract included two exculpatory clauses relieving Unterweser from lia-
bility for damages to the towed drilling rig.'8 On January 5, 1968, the
8 Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
9 Central Contracting Co. v. C.E. Youngdahl & Co., 418 Pa. 122, 133, 209 A.2d 810,
816 (1965).
10 Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 358 U.S. 809 (1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
11 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
12 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 358 U.S. 809 (1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S.
180 (1959).
13 407 U.S. 1 (1972), vacating and remanding In re Unterweser Reederei GmbH, 446
F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971), arfg on rehearing per curiam 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'g
296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
14 407 U.S. at 2.
15 Id. The High Court of Justice in London is a neutral forum with much experience
in admiralty litigation. Id. at 12.
16 The general conditions of the contract included provisions that Unterweser and
its agents were "not responsible for defaults and/or errors in the navigation of the tow"
and that any damages to the drilling rig would be "in any case for account of its Owners."
Id. at 3 n.2.
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Bremen departed for Italy with the rig in tow. When the craft reached
the international waters of the Gulf of Mexico, a severe storm arose.
Mounting waves caused the rig to roll sharply, damaging it extensively.
Zapata instructed the Bremen to tow its damaged equipment to Tampa,
Florida, the nearest port of refuge. Upon her arrival in Tampa, the
tug was immediately arrested by a United States marshal, acting pur-
suant to a complaint filed by Zapata.17 The complaint, the filing of
which was itself a breach of the contract's choice of forum clause, al-
leged both negligent towage and breach of contract.
In its defense, Unterweser pleaded the choice of forum clause, and
asked the district court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction or
on forum non conveniens grounds. In the alternative, Unterweser
sought a stay of the action pending submission of the dispute to the
London Court of Justice.18 On July 29, 1968, in an unreported opinion,
the district court denied Unterweser's motions.19 The court held the
choice of forum clause to be invalid per se.20 Analyzing the motion to
dismiss along traditional forum non conveniens lines, the court con-
cluded that the balance of convenience was not so strongly in favor of
Unterweser that Zapata's choice of forum should be disturbed. From
the date on which it received notice of the claim, Unterweser had six
months to file for a limitation on its liability in the affair.21 On July
2, 1968, ten days before the end of the six months, while still awaiting
a decision, on its motions, Unterweser was forced to file such a limitation
action in the Florida district court. Simultaneously, Unterweser moved
to stay the limitation proceedings. Consistent with its earlier unreported
decision, the district court, on January 21, 1969, denied Unterweser's
motion for a stay in the limitation action.22 The Court of Appeals af-
firmed,23 over a strong dissent by Judge Wisdom.24
17 The complaint was directed at both Unterweser in personam and the Bremen in
rem. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2464(c) (1970), the Bremen was released from custody when
Unterweser furnished security in the sum of $3,500,000, the amount claimed by Zapata in
the libel action.
18 Shortly after Zapata filed its action in the district court and in line with its theory
that the choice of forum clause controlled, Unterweser instituted an action against Zapata
in the High Court of Justice in London. In the suit Unterweser claimed damages for
Zapata's breach of contract in disregarding the choice of forum clause and sought other
money due it under the contract,
19 In re Unterweser Reederei GmbH, Civ.. No. 21 (M.D. Fla. July 29, 1968).
20 For a discussion by Chief Justice Burger of the unreported district court opinion,
see 407 U.S. at 6.
21 46 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
22 296 F. Supp. at 736. In the limitation proceeding, the district court granted Zapata's
motion to restrain Unterweser from further litigation in London and denied a second
attempt by Unterweser to gain a stay in the Florida proceedings. The decision to deny
the motion for a stay was on essentially the same grounds as in the unreported opinion,
1973]
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The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit judgment and re-
manded, stating that the Court of Appeals had given "far too little
weight" to the choice of forum clause.25 Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the Court, embraced the "void only if unreasonable" test for choice
of forum agreements and posited it as the doctrine to be followed by
federal courts sitting in admiralty.2 Pointing out that the Bremen and
her tow were to traverse the waters of many jurisdictions and might
have been forced to stop at several ports of refuge, the Court observed
that it was reasonable for the parties to have attempted to fix a mu-
tually agreeable jurisdiction to handle their disputes.27 The majority
of the Court viewed the elimination of this uncertainty as an integral
part of an international contract.28 Consequently, the Court placed the
burden on the party seeking to escape the choice of forum agreement,
Zapata, to show that trial in the contractually designated forum would
for all practical purposes deprive it of its day in court.29 Otherwise, in
the absence of "fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining
power," the contracting parties would be held to their bargain.30
The Court recognized Zapata's contention that the English courts
would hold the exculpatory clauses in the contract prima facie valid
and enforceable.31 Although this type of clause had been considered
but with the additional justification that since Unterweser had invoked the American
court's jurisdiction to obtain the benefit of the Limitation Act, it could not now deny that
jurisdiction. For a discussion of this point, see 39 U. CIN. L. Rv. 819 (1970).
23 In re Unterweser Reederei GmbH, 428 F.2d 888 (1970), aff'd on rehearing per
curiam, 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
24 Judge Wisdom in his dissent analogizes the development of the judicial attitude
toward choice of forum clauses and the treatment accorded arbitration agreements. 428
F.2d at 899. At one time arbitration clauses were also considered void as against public
policy. See United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006
(S.D.N.Y. 1915). Today, however, arbitration agreements are enforced like any other
contract provision. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). The
rapid change in this area can be attributed largely to the enactment of statutes dealing
with the enforceability of arbitration agreements. See, e.g., Federal Arbitration Act, § 1,
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1963).
25 407 U.S. at 8.
26 Id. at 10.
27 Manifestly much uncertainty and possibly great inconvenience to both parties
could arise if a suit could be maintained in any jurisdiction in which an accident
might occur or if jurisdiction were left to any place where the Bremen, or
Unterweser might happen to be found.
Id. at 13. This language and the court's treatment of the subject strongly suggest an
analogy between choice of forum clauses and stipulated damage provisions.
28 Id. at 13-14.
29 Id. at 18.
30 Id. The Court found none of these factors in the Zapata facts. See id. at 12 nn.14
& 15.
31 Id. at 8 n.8.
[Vol. 58:416
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
contrary to public policy by the Supreme Court itself in similar cases,82
the Court was willing to decline jurisdiction and to allow the litigants
to proceed in London, thereby subjecting the American corporation to
judgment on the exculpatory clauses. The Court did not overrule its
earlier decisions on the validity of the exculpatory clauses, but instead
classified the contract in question as an "international commercial agree-
ment" and as such not governed by prior rulings.83
II
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF Zapata
The Court in Zapata held that a choice of forum clause in an in-
ternational commercial agreement will be enforced by a federal court
sitting in admiralty unless the forum agreement is shown to be un-
reasonable by the resisting party.34 Although limited to suits on interna-
tional commercial agreements brought in admiralty, the decision cannot
fail to have an impact on the future treatment of other types of interna-
tional contracts. The majority contended that if the future develop-
ment of American international trade is to be facilitated, courts must
not insist that dealings be made exclusively on American terms, gov-
erned by American laws, or resolved in American courts,35 and con-
demned such an attitude as "parochial."38 This rationale applies equally
well to those international disputes which do not fall within the court's
admiralty jurisdiction. Indeed, the Court implied that all international
commercial agreements are deserving of legal treatment different from
that accorded wholly domestic dealings.37 While the Court may have
been reluctant to hand down a rule broader than that necessitated by
the controversy before it, the influence of the present decision will prob-
ably not be confined to admiralty. The ultimate fairness of the Zapata
test, which requires both the reasonableness of the choice of forum and
the absence of fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power
between the parties, would justify its application in any case involving
a private international agreement.
It is easier to predict that the Zapata ruling will not be limited to
admiralty cases than it is to define clearly the extent and nature of its
32 Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 872 U.S. 697 (1963); Bisso
v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
33 407 U.S. at 16.
34 Id. at 10.
35 Id. at 9.
30 Id.
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potential effect. This.note will discuss Zapata's role in the rapidly devel-
oping body of American international law. More specifically, since the
choice of forum clause issue has been litigated several times previously3
in controversies governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA),s9 the note will deal with Zapata's possible effect on inter-
national cases falling within this statute.
A. Zapata as a Liberalizing Influence on the Judicial Treatment of
International Contracts
Zapata suggests that in the future the Supreme Court will be
likely to take a more favorable view of any reasonable contract provi-
sion found in an international commercial agreement. Commercial
considerations will force a re-evaluation of those contractual terms
which have always been considered taboo in domestic agreements. 40
The Court in Zapata noted that the expansion of American business
and industry would hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding formal
contracts, the courts insisted that all disputes involving Americans be
resolved under American laws and in American courts. 41 Any inter-
national contract is necessarily a compromise of two different juris-
prudential outlooks.42 As a result, the Court enforced the choice of
forum clause and found that the public policy considerations voiding
exculpatory clauses in domestic contracts did not apply to the inter-
national agreement in Zapata.43 Both choice of forum and exculpatory
clauses would be upheld in certain foreign tribunals,44 and their en-
forcement by the Court in Zapata can be attributed to a compromise
dictated by commercial considerations. 45
38 See notes 52-57 and accompanying text infra.
39 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
40 See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra. For example, in Zapata the Court was
willing to enforce indirectly the exculpatory clauses which it had formerly held void as
against public policy in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
41 407 U.S. at 9, 11-12.
42 "We cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and international waters
exclusively on our terms governed by our laws, and resolved in our courts." Id. at 9.
43 Id. at 15-16.
44 Id. at 8 & n.8, 10-11 & n.12.
45 "Thus, in the light of present-day commercial realities and expanding international
trade we conclude that the forum clause should control absent a strong showing that it
should be set aside." Id. at 15.
The view that the Zapata decision may signal a new laissez-faire attitude toward inter-
national contracts is reinforced by the Supreme Court's view that the case is related to
National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964). See 407 U.S. at 10. This links
Zapata with the progressive attitude of the Court toward in personam adjudicatory
authority. Szukhent held that the federal courts must permit a party to designate by
contract an agent for receipt of process in a jurisdiction where otherwise the party
could not be served. The Court premised the expansion of the scope of state jurisdiction
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In deciding to enforce the choice of forum clause, the Court found
that policy considerations which would void exculpatory clauses in a
domestic agreement were inapplicable to the Zapata situation. By forc-
ing the parties to litigate in England, the Court ensured the eventual
enforcement of the exculpatory clauses. This indirect enforcement of
the exculpatory provisions may indicate the Court's willingness to en-
force such clauses directly in future cases involving international com-
mercial contracts. Similarly, when other policy considerations of a
particular jurisdiction which limit the rights of international contrac-
tors are re-examined, the Court may place greater weight on the agree-
ment of the parties. If the Zapata safeguards are met, the Court is likely
to enforce the clause in question.46
B. Zapata and COGSA
Although the Zapata decision may provide a new freedom for
American citizens engaged in international dealings, 47 the effect of
over foreign corporations and other nonresidents largely on the transformation of the
national economy. Nationalization of the economy has effaced the economic significance
of state lines, and modem "facilities for transportation and communication have removed
much of the difficulty and inconvenience formerly encountered in defending lawsuits
brought in other states." Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d
482, 442-48, 176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961). This same rationale lies at the root of Zapata:
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas commercial
activities by business enterprises based in the United States. The barrier of distance
that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest territory no longer
does so.
407 US. at 8. The commercial and practical considerations which induced the Court to
overturn a long-standing and universally accepted domestic rule of jurisdiction in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 826 U.S. 810 (1945), may portend a similar liberalization
in the international contract area.
Because the disposition of a choice of forum lause question involves a determination
of jurisdiction, it could be argued that the Court's reference to Szukhent merely stands
for the jurisdictional proposition that choice of forum agreements are valid if reasonable.
The Court, however, was not content with a strictly legal analysis of the problem; it placed
much emphasis on policy considerations relevant to America's commercial growth. 407
US. at 8-9. In addition, the dispatch with which the Court treats the exculpatory clause
argument indicates that the Court referred to Szukhent not only for its content but also
for the spirit of change it represents. The Zapata opinion could not be confined to a
narrow discussion of the relative merits of choice of forum agreements because haunting
every argument was the spectre of the exculpatory clauses. The Court, which had the
opportunity to rule on the choice of forum issue in Carbon Black free of this burden,
chose instead to assert the validity of the choice of forum cause in Zapata, where the
exculpatory clause issue militated against the Court's ultimate finding.
46 The Court has acknowledged that it cannot always expect international agreements
to be decided under American law. See note 42 and accompanying text supra. It would
seem, then, that a contract which contains provisions unpopular in American law but quite
acceptable in the tradition of the foreign party's law should be judged under the foreign
law's "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
47 Presumably, an American citizen who wishes to have Italian law govern his contract
could provide for this with any party other than another American. See 407 U.S. at 17.
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Zapata could be minimal in those areas of international commerce
which are regulated by Congress. For example, COGSA defines the
responsibilities and liabilities of the parties to an international carriage
contract.48 COGSA applies to every bill of lading evidencing "a con-
tract for the carriage of goods by sea to or from ports of the United
States." 49 One provision of the Act declares that exculpatory agreements
in the contract between the carrier and the shipper are to be consid-
ered void." Chief Justice Burger noted without comment that COGSA
was not applicable to Zapata, 51 although it had affected the controver-
sies in Muller,52 Carbon Black,53 and Indussa Corp. v. SS Ranborg.54
The Muller court reasoned that if Congress had intended forum agree-
ments to be void under COGSA it would have voided them specifi-
cally,55 and declined to rule that the cost of litigation in a foreign forum
would bring the contract within the COGSA ban on exculpatory agree-
ments.56 Later, in Indussa, the Second Circuit overruled its holding
in Muller. Applying COGSA to a similar situation, it held that the
costs of litigation did indeed lessen liability within the statute's mean-
ing.57 Zapata suggests that the Supreme Court may be ready to rein-
state the Muller reasoning.
48 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970).
49 Id. § 1300.
50 Any ... agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship
from liability . . . arising from negligence, fault, or failure in the duties and
obligations provided in this section, or lessening such liability ... shall be null
and void and of no effect.
Id. § 1303(8). By enforcing the choice of forum clause in Zapata (supposing COGSA to
apply), the court would be indirectly enforcing the exculpatory clauses proscribed in
§ 1303(3). For further discussions of COGSA and choice of forum clauses, see Note, Ocean
Bills of Lading and Some Problems of Conflict of Laws, 58 COLUM. L. Rxv. 212 (1958), and
14 WAYNE L. RaV. 609 (1968).
51 407 U.S. at 10 n.ll. Although neither the Supreme Court nor the inferior courts
stated why COGSA was not applicable, it is apparent that the contract in question would
at least come under the exception defined in 46 U.S.C. § 1806 (1970), which states that
extraordinary circumstances surrounding the performance of the contract would exempt
the parties from the COGSA limitations. Such special conditions serve to free the con-
tractors to agree on any terms allocating liability, as long as the agreement is set forth
in non-negotiable form.
52 Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955).
53 Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. SS Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 358
U.S. 809 (1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
54 377 F.2d 200, 202 (2d Cir. 1967).
55 224 F.2d at 807. The Court contrasted the COGSA provision with a comparable
Australian statute. Id. See Sea-Carriage of Goods Act of 1924, § 9(1), IV Commonwealth
Acts 1901-1950, at 3921, 3922 (Australia 1953).
56 224 F.2d at 807. See note 50 supra.
57 377 F.2d at 202.
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While the Court might generally tend to follow Muller and over-
look the costs of foreign litigation in determining what is proscribed
by COGSA, a different case is presented where the contract contains
specific exculpatory clauses. In this situation the reasoning of Justice
Douglas, the lone dissenter in Zapata, would have additional force.
Douglas felt that the stratagem of specifying a foreign forum in order
to escape local policy was the same as invoking a foreign law of con-
struction, except that the former plan added the expense of foreign
litigation.58 Indeed, the majority in Zapata states that a choice of forum
clause would be unenforceable if it contravened a strong public policy
of the forum deciding its validity. 9 Thus, if Zapata had been a COGSA
case, the Act's stated policy voiding exculpatory clauses might have
forced the Court to negate the choice of forum agreement.
On the other hand, Chief Justice Burger's opinion indicates the
Supreme Court's strong concern for the direction of American juris-
prudence in the international area. Having held in Zapata that the
rationale for voiding exculpatory clauses does not apply to foreign
transactions, in a future Zapata-type case covered by COGSA, the Court
may be unwilling to follow the exculpatory clause provision in COGSA
unless it is sure that Congress intended enforcement of the COGSA
prohibition under such circumstances. In the Court's view, the question
faced on appeal in Zapata was whether the district court should have
exercised its jurisdiction by addressing issues beyond the expectations
of the parties under the choice of forum clause.60 The posture of that
question suggests that if the Court can satisfy itself that there was no
fraud, undue influence, or overweening bargaining power and that
the party resisting would still have a day in court, the controversy
would be dismissed in favor of the designated foreign tribunal. No
consideration would be given the question of other contract terms, as,
for example, exculpatory clauses, which might be contrary to COGSA.
This treatment would result, however, only if the Court could con-
vince itself that the ban on exculpatory clauses found in COGSA was
not mandated in a choice of forum-exculpatory clause situation.6' As
58 407 U.S. at 24 n.
59 Id. at 15.
60 Id. at 12.
61 Zapata may indicate that the Court is so inclined, and the disposition of arbitration
agreements under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14, 201-08 (1970), may offer
the Court some help by way of analogy. Although this procedure seems devious, the
result is the same as would occur if the clause in question were an arbitration agreement.
In Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha Ltd. v. M/S Galine, 323 F. Supp. 79 (S.D. Tex. 1971), a
charter-party contract contained a provision that all sections of COGSA should apply. It
also provided that all contractual disputes were to be arbitrated in London. When a
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Muller pointed out,62 Congress has not made its view manifest by
specifically banning forum agreements as other COGSA countries have
done.63 In view of the indefiniteness of the congressional position and
in light of its expressed belief6" in the need for flexibility in this area,
in a future case similar to Zapata, but under COGSA, the Supreme
Court may uphold a choice of forum clause. This would have the effect
of forcing Congress to make known its policy toward international
choice of forum agreements covered by COGSA. Congress would then
have to ban choice of forum agreements specifically, provide for their
enforcement, or remain silent, tacitly approving the Supreme Court's
action.
CONCLUSION
In domestic litigation, the Zapata decision is likely to be very
persuasive in excising the last vestiges of the invalid per se doctrine.65
In fact, the Court labeled its finding in Zapata as merely the other side
dispute arose, the argument was raised that under Carbon Black and Indussa the
arbitration clause should not be enforced because it was contrary to COGSA. Id. at 83.
The district court refuted this argument by noting that arbitration agreements were
endorsed by the Federal Arbitration Act. Id. at 83. The Galine court cited Indussa for
the proposition that any differences between the two acts would probably be decided in
favor of the Federal Arbitration Act because it had been enacted into positive law. Id. at 84.
The court ordered the parties to proceed to arbitration. Thus, it would seem that under the
Galine-Zapata rationale a conract within COGSA which contained both an exculpatory
clause and an agreement to arbitrate in a foreign country would probably be so arbitrated.
See A. KNAuTH, OcEAN BnIzs OF LADING 239 (4th ed. 1953). By enforcing a choice of forum
clause in this situation, the court would simply be taking upon itself the responsibility
of treating choice of forum clauses the same way it has been directed to treat arbitration
agreements by Congress.
The protection afforded by the Zapata test would support the central purpose of
COGSA-protecting the shipper from adhesion contracts. See Standard Electrica, S.A. v.
Hamburg Sudamerikanische Dampfschifffahrts-Gesellschaft, 375 F.2d 943, 945 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 831 (1967): "When COGSA was enacted in 1936, it had as its central
purpose the avoidance of adhesion contracts, providing protection for the shipper against
the inequality in bargaining power." Commercial considerations and the realization that
one of the parties is dealing from a background of different laws and traditions which
might not include a COGSA-type statute could influence courts to adopt the arbitration
model.
62 224 F.2d at 807.
63 See note 56 supra.
64 See notes 35-36, 41 and accompanying text supra.
65 In acknowledging that the circuits had differed in their approach to choice of
forum clauses, the Court cited Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341
(3d Cir. 1966). This case was not international in nature but involved a federal district
court in Pennsylvania which declined jurisdiction in a controversy where the parties had
provided by contract to arbitrate in New York under that state's laws.
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of the proposition recognized earlier in National Equipment Rental,
Ltd. v. Szukhent.66 On the underlying issue of the exculpatory clause
and similar clauses which would be contrary to a particular juris-
diction's public policy, the Zapata decision will most likely not affect
domestic litigation. The need to relax these policy considerations on
the domestic front is not as pressing as the need to excise all tinges
of parochialism in the international area. Moreover, because of the
relatively common judicial traditions among the states, conflicts with
regard to public policy issues are less likely to arise.
One undeniable benefit of recent foreign relations developments
will be increased international trade; decreased international hostility
will mean increased international commercial involvement. The Su-
preme Court in Zapata appears ready to facilitate this development.
Hopefully, under the aegis of Zapata, settled contract doctrines will be
re-evaluated in light of the unique considerations presented by inter-
national commercial agreements, and courts will allow international
contractors more freedom in their dealings.
Richard D. Avil, Jr.
66 375 US. 311 (1964). See note 45 supra.
